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Abstract
Anti-malware software producers are continually chal-
lenged to identify and counter new malware as it is released
into the wild. A dramatic increase in malware production
in recent years has rendered the conventional method of
manually determining a signature for each new malware
sample untenable. This paper presents a scalable, auto-
mated approach for detecting and classifying malware by
using pattern recognition algorithms and statistical meth-
ods at various stages of the malware analysis life cycle. Our
framework combines the static features of function length
and printable string information extracted from malware
samples into a single test which gives classification results
better than those achieved by using either feature individu-
ally. In our testing we input feature information from close
to 1400 unpacked malware samples to a number of differ-
ent classification algorithms. Using k-fold cross validation
on the malware, which includes Trojans and viruses, along
with 151 clean files, we achieve an overall classification ac-
curacy of over 98%.
Key words : Malware, classification, string, function
length.
1. Introduction
Malicious software, malware for short, is a significant
threat to the Internet as well as to the computing commu-
nity. Furthermore, the anti-detection techniques employed
by malware are becoming more and more sophisticated.
Malware is now being driven by organized crime, with the
two most common payloads being the theft of personal in-
formation and the recruitment of computers to botnets.
Until recently, developers of anti-malware software used
manual means of recognizing and classifying malware.
However, the enormous increase in volume now forces them
to rely heavily on automatic malware analysis, detection
and categorization techniques. Thus, in the last ten years or
so, researchers have searched for reliable automated mal-
ware classification methods. A substantial amount of re-
cent research work has focused on development of tools
for collecting, monitoring and run-time analysis of malware
[1, 13, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 16, 14]. An added compli-
cation is that current sophisticated clean software (clean-
ware) has many of the features of malware (using library
calls, containing executables and so on); thus it is critically
important to produce techniques which reliably distinguish
cleanware from malware. Thus, we have included a large
sample of cleanware in our experimental data.
The malware analyzed in this paper is from CA’s VET
Zoo (www.ca.com) and has been pre-classified using gen-
erally acceptable mechanical means. Such a classification
relies on the ability to determine the significant feature or
features which establish the true identification of the mal-
ware. This significant feature is referred to as ’the signa-
ture’. Many research papers have been directed at deter-
mining this signature [10, 11, 12]. The implication is that
there is some unique factor which defines a piece of code.
While this may be the case for a specific sample, given the
many obfuscation techniques available, it is unlikely to be
true for a general family; there may be several features of a
piece of code which together indicate its purpose, but which
separately do not definitively reveal this information.
This paper presents an automated malware classification
system based on static feature selection. In previous work,
we developed classification techniques based on function
length [11], where feature vectors are extracted individu-
ally based on function length frequency (we refer to this
technique as FLF), and then on printable string informa-
tion [12] (we refer to this technique as PSI). See section
3 for details. An argument in favour of examining func-
tion features is that, while malware writers use obfuscation
and polymorphic technologies, such as inserting junk bytes
of instructions, instruction replacement or register replace-
ment, these low-level assembler mnemonics would change
the size and appearance of the code but not affect its over-
all functionThus function features of the unpacked malware
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are expected to be retained and useful in identification. In
choosing strings as a feature, we noted that an obfuscated
file usually does not have any strings consisting of words or
sentences; packers encode almost all of the strings as non-
printable or random characters. Thus those strings present
should be useful in malware identification.
However, function features and string features are inde-
pendent of each other and so, in classifying malware, we
expect each to reinforce the other, thus giving better results
than either separately. Our purpose in this paper is to test
this hypothesis.
Thus, we present a combined approach in the current
paper drawing on both the FLF and PSI techniques. In
our experiment, we input feature information from over
1500 samples, including unpacked Trojans and viruses
from the CA Zoo along with clean files from several dif-
ferent Windows environments. We invoked five well-
known classification algorithms all from the WEKA li-
braries (http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/), including
a tree-based classifier, a nearest neighbour algorithm and a
statistical learning algorithm, and with each of these again
tested in conjunction with the booster algorithm Adaboost.
In order to perform our work more efficiently, we moved
to a database environment which provided us with an in-
tegrated management interface, a standard format for bina-
ries and better and faster interoperability with other tools
and databases. We used Ida2sql (www.dkbza.org), a Python
module which exports disassembly information from our
disassembly tool IDA into the SQL schema [3].
We show in this paper that our combined classification
technique achieves over 98% classification accuracy, indeed
improving on both techniques separately and confirming
our hypothesis. These results also strengthen the argument
against the existence of a unique signature usable for mal-
ware identification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: background
on similar classification techniques is presented in Section
2. Section 3 describes the methods used in our previous
work on the function length and string methods indepen-
dently. The combined classification model is described in
Section 4. Section 5 describes the experimental set-up.
Comparative results are presented in Section 6 and discus-
sion and conclusions follow in Section 7.
2. Related Work
The push towards automation of malware identification
and classification has led to general research into automated
procedures with two approaches predominating: one based
on the use of static features and the second, based on the
use of dynamic features appearing when the code is exe-
cuted. In this section, we first review the current static fea-
ture work, followed by the dynamic feature research.
In 2009, Leder et.al. [7] proposed an approach to clas-
sify metamorphic variants of static features. Metamorphic
malware changes its code and structure from infection to in-
fection and is missed by most virus-scanners. The authors
use a static analysis technique that estimates the memory
contents of the program without executing it. While their
results are close to perfect, they are based on only six mal-
ware samples and cannot be applied when no estimation of
the memory content is available.
Several authors have used sequences of system calls, API
calls and function calls of malware in order to model its be-
haviour. For example, Ye et.al. [15] present a classifier us-
ing a post-processing technique based on an analysis of API
execution calls. They input a large collection of executables
including 35,000 malware and 15,000 cleanware samples,
and using various data mining techniques they achieved
close to 88% accuracy.
An intelligent instruction sequence-based malware cate-
gorization system is presented in [5], consisting of three in-
tegrated modules: feature extractor, classification and sig-
nature generator. The authors use a clustering method to
classify 2029 malware samples from 407 families. Their
method is similar to ours in that they use IDA Pro Dissas-
embler to extract function calls from the unpacked malware.
Their method produces close to 79% accuracy across their
data set.
In [11], the authors use two aspects of functions to clas-
sify unpacked viruses by using the k-fold validation method:
one is the length of the function as measured by the num-
ber of bytes of code in it; the other is the frequency with
which function lengths occur within any particular sample
of malware. The results indicate that both of these function
features are significant in identifying the family to which
a piece of malware belongs. The same authors also tested
string information as a tool for feature extraction in [12],
and claim that the string information is extremely effec-
tive for malware classification compared to previous meth-
ods. The results of both techniques along with those of sev-
eral other recent papers are compared with our results in
Section 5.
Finally, on the static data side, we mention the research
presented in [4], which describes an architecture for auto-
mated malware classification based on massively parallel
processing of common code sequences found in the static
malware. Only portions of this architecture have been im-
plemented at this time, and the cost appears to be signifi-
cant.
We now turn to some recent papers which use a behav-
ioral analysis approach. In [16], the authors trace the be-
havior of malware in a virtual machine environment and use
these traces to extract string information on which their tests
are based. From 13,223 malware samples, and using a sup-
port vector machine method, they are able to classify with
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an average accuracy of 83.3%.
A behavioral model based on attribute-grammars, in-
cluding semantic attributes and rules which model the be-
havior of malware, was developed in [6]. Their experiment
tested about 200 samples of Portable Executable malware
and about the same number of Visual Basic Script malware,
along with 50 clean files. While their method only detected
51% of PE malware executables accurately, it performed
much better on Visual Basic scripts achieving an 89% suc-
cess rate.
Ahmed et.al. [1] proposed a composite scheme for
malware classification that extracts statistical features from
both spatial and temporal information available in run-time
API calls. Using 237 API calls from six different functional
categories, their tests on 416 malware and 100 cleanware
files showed that their system provides an average accuracy
of 98%. They also carried out a scalability analysis which
shows that monitoring only memory management and file
input/output API calls can provide an accuracy of 97%.
Most classification approaches assume that the malware
is unpacked. Unpacking malware is a difficult and slow pro-
cess which needs techniques quite different from those used
for classification. Many research groups focus solely on the
unpacking problem. Thus we, along with most classifica-
tion researchers, assume that we are working with malware
which is not packed.
In the next section we describe previous work in [11] and
[12] upon which we base our current test.
3. Classification Using Static Features
Feature extraction is an important part of data classifi-
cation. The general approach to the classification problem
using static data is to extract a range of static features from
each malware sample that can be passed to an automated
classification system. In [11] and [12], the authors extracted
the static features of unpacked malware based on the meth-
ods used in the FLF [11] and the PSI [12] techniques in-
dependently. This paper suggests combining the FLF and
PSI features and passed it to a classification engine. The
following subsections briefly describe the feature extraction
process.
3.1. Function Length Frequency (FLF)
In [11], functions, as determined by IDA, form the ba-
sis of a classification system for malware. The length of
the function is measured by the number of bytes of code in
it. Two aspects of these functions were used: one is the fre-
quency with which function lengths occur within any partic-
ular sample of malware; the other is function length pattern.
(In the current paper, we use only the first aspect as the clas-
sification results obtained are superior to those in based on
function length).
In [11], the authors extracted function length informa-
tion from the Ida2DB database. For each sample a list con-
taining the length (in bytes) for all the functions was con-
structed. The list was then sorted from the shortest length
function to the longest, and graphed to give the function
length pattern. Figure 1 displays three samples from the
Robzips family and Figure 2 displays three samples from
the Robknot family .
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Figure 1. Samples of function length pattern
for Robzips family.
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Figure 2. Samples of function length pattern
for Robknot family.
The authors noticed that, within the same malware fam-
ily, although the number of functions and their lengths var-
ied, the shape of the function length pattern was similar.
This motivated them to investigate whether function length
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contains statistically significant information for classifying
malware.
The FLF test is based on counting the number of func-
tions in different length ranges. The function length is de-
fined to be the number of bytes in the function as defined
by IDA. An example of a function length vector, taken from
the Beovens family, is (24, 38, 46, 52, 118, 122, 124, 140,
204, 650, 694, 1380). (All vectors and sets referred to in
their paper, and in the current one, are ordered.) Each com-
ponent in this vector represents the length of a function in
the sample. We then count the number of functions in dif-
ferent length ranges; we say it as function length frequency
(FLF).
3.2. Printable String Information (PSI)
The aim of the PSI process is to extract the printable
strings from unpacked malware samples, as indicated in
[12] and to analyze their occurrences in the samples. In the
experiment, most the strings used for classification are not
malicious in themselves but are produced by library calls.
However the combination of printable strings, that is which
library calls the code relies on, forms a kind of ”‘digital fin-
gerprint”’.
Once extracted, the string information is used to create a
list of all strings that occur in the database. Each string is
given a specific position in the list. Each malware sample
is compared with the global list and then represented by a
binary vector denoting strings which the malware sample
contains or not, recorded as a true/false binary value.
Figure 3 shows a sample of strings from the global list
along with their frequencies in the database.
Figure 3. Sample of string list
4. Proposed Classification Model
In the current paper, we merge the extracted static fea-
tures using both the FLF and PSI methods from [11] and
[12]. Since we use an extended data set in this paper, we
repeat the disassembly process using IDA, export the disas-
sembly analysis to a database, extract the feature vectors of
both malware and clean samples, and then pass the gener-
ated vectors into the classification engine. Figure 4 shows
the overview of our classification process.
Malware binaries
(CA Zoo) and 
cleanware 
samples 
(Windows) 
Pre-process the 
samples
(unpacked /
disassembly)
Extract the 
feature 
Vectors (function 
length and string)
Classification and 
evaluation
(WEKA Interface)
Figure 4. Static feature based classification
process
4.1. Sample Preparation
The corpus of malware families used in our system was
obtained from CA’s VET Zoo; the clean files were collected
manually from various versions of Windows. It was neces-
sary to unpack the malware samples before analyzing them.
We used the tool VMUnpacker v1.3 to unpack most of the
malware samples in this experiment.
IDA Pro V5.1 was used to disassemble the samples. Our
system uses Ida2sql, a Python module [3], to export the
disassembly information from IDA into an SQL database
which we call Ida2DB, as shown in Figure 5. The database
schema for Ida2DB is same schema used in the papers [11]
and [12].
Samples 
to be 
analyzed
Pre-Process
(unpacking)
Extract 
Feature 
Vector
Similarity 
Comparison 
Ida2DBIDA IDE
IDA  Python 
Interface Ida2sql
IDB
Ms Sql Server 
Python Interface
Classification and 
Clustering 
System
Figure 5. Block diagram of sample pre-
processing
4.2 Combining the Feature Vectors
As noted earlier, the FLF and PSI features appear to con-
tain some information which is independent of each other
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and we expected each to reinforce the other, thus giving bet-
ter results than either separately.
Figure 6 depicts the combined classification model.
We first fetched FLF and PSI attributes from the Ida2DB
database using ”‘sql statements”’ which then enabled us to
produce the feature vectors. Our model allows us to ef-
fectively extract large amounts of disassembly information
and obtain a wide range of features of a malware sample in
a swift and simple way.
In extracting the FLF features, we divide the function
length scale into intervals, which we call bins, and for each
sample count the frequency of functions occurring in each
bin. Due to order of magnitude differences between func-
tion lengths, we used an exponential function model to rep-
resent the increase in the range covered by the bins. For ex-
ample, we might count the number of functions of lengths
between 1 and e bytes, the number between e and e2 bytes,
etc. In the experiment, we choose m¯ = 50 as the num-
ber of bins. This now allows us to associate a new vec-
tor of size 50 with each function length vector. We again
used an exponential function over the entire spectrum of the
dataset, from heights 1 to M , M being the maximum func-
tion length across the complete dataset. Assuming that this
exponential function is given by y = aekx where y(0) = 1
and y(m¯) = M , it follows that a = 1, k = lnM/m¯, and
so y = e
lnM
m¯ x
. For illustration, let M =500 and m¯ ==10,
which indicates that there are 10 bins and each bin ranges
from e(i−1)kx to eikx, where i = 1...m¯. Given a sample
with original vector = (2,2,6,6,8,12,12,12,12,12,24, 36, 48,
56, 87, 120, 340, 469), then the standardized vector would
be (0.0,2.0,2.0,6.0,0.0,2.0,2.0,2.0,0.0,2.0).
From the extracted PSI features, we generated a string
list based on the global list of strings - the ordered list of
all strings occurring in our malware database. In the exper-
iment, we chose the minimal string length to be 3, ignoring
those strings of up to two bytes. Disregarding these smaller
strings allowed us to significantly reduce computation.
Let G = {s1, s2, s3, . . . sn} be the global ordered set
of all strings si. Examples of strings were given in Figure
3. Let F represent the n families in our test, one of which
contains all the cleanware samples. The notation is
F = {f1, f2 . . . , fn}. (1)
In our database, the elements of each family fi are repre-
sented in a fashion based on the associated module id M ij .
For any particular family fi having q elements and ID Mk,
we can therefore write
fi = {M i1,M i2, . . .M iq} (2)
and refer to M iq as the size of module id of a particular fam-
ily.
In our database M ij is represented as a binary vector in-
dicating whether a particular string is present or not in the
global set of ordered strings G, that is
M ij = (s
i
j1, s
i
j2, . . . , s
i
j|G|) (3)
where
sijl =
{
0 if the lthstring of G is not inmodule vectorM ij
1 otherwise
For illustration, suppose G =
{“kernel32”, “advapi32”, “GetModuleHandleA”,
“OpenProcess”, “LoadLibrary”} is the set of all strings
from all samples. Let M ij be a member of the family fi
Then M ij = (1,0,1,0,1), means that the strings ”advapi32”
and ”OpenProcess” are not present in the sample M ij , while
the three remaining strings in G are all present.
In our experiment, we have observed that some families
produce enormous sizes of features which make massive
computational complexity, resulting low efficiency in the
training model of classifier. We have explored those data
(which are huge) and found that, a number of strings from
global list occur very infrequently within the family (for ex-
ample not at all or only within a handful of samples.) We
assumed those strings are less significant for the family.
We have tested different reduction rates for eliminating
the least occurring strings, and found 10% feature reduction
gives optimum result, we say it threshold value δth. So we
throw away strings whose occurrence in the family is less
than δth of the total samples in the family. To select features
for the family fi based on our investigation, we then select a
restricted ordered subset Gir , based on global set G. That is
Gir = {gir1, gir2, . . . , gir|Gir|} (4)
where girj are the string from the training set Ttr for the
family fi. The training data represents as a set of binary
vector of string information, same as M ij as shown in equa-
tion 3, for a specific family fi can be represents as
T ij = (t
i
j1, t
i
j2, . . . , t
i
j|Gir |) (5)
where
tijl =
{
0 if the lthstring of Gir is not inmodule vectorM ij
1 otherwise
We now combine by concatenating the vectors both from
the restricted PSI feature and FLF feature to produce our
experimental data. Figure 7 shows the sample of combined
features for sample 284 of the Robzips family.
4.3. Learning and Classification
Machine learning techniques are applied in our model
for identifying the family. The basic concept of the train-
ing model of a classifier is that it employs a set of training
13
Ida2DB
Both function length and 
string information
Function 
Length 
freq.
Generate new vector
Generate module ID 
(MID)
Extract string 
information from MID
Generate new vectors
Count 
frequencies of 
functions of 
different length 
ranges
String 
information
Create family data
F1...Fn 
Feature reduction 
Figure 6. Block diagram of our classification model
Figure 7. Combined feature vector sample for
sample 284 of the Robzip family.
samples of the form {(x1, y1), ..., (xk, yk)} for the projec-
tion of a function f(x). Here the values of x are typically
of the form (xi,1, xi,2, ..., xi,n), and are composed of either
real or discrete values. The y values represent the expected
outputs for the given x values, and are usually drawn from a
discrete set of classes. Consequently, the task of a learning
model involves the approximation of the function f(x) to
produce a classifier.
In the training model, we use a particular family and the
same number of instances by randomly selected from other
families. Then we split the data in K different folds and
we use(.8Ttr : .2Tts) technique for making k-fold cross
validation. Then use these training set to train the classifier
and evaluate the classification result by using the test data.
The same rotating process applies for all other families.
4.4. WEKA Interface
In our system, we built an interface program for our data
classification. The interface will link with Ida2DB database
to collect the data for preprocessing. In our architecture we
integrated WEKA into our system. WEKA is a set of data
mining tools used mainly for classification and clustering.
It is a collection of machine learning algorithms to perform
data mining tasks, which includes decision trees and tables,
rule learners, Naive Bayes, support vector machines, voted
perceptrons and multi-layer perceptrons algorithms can ei-
ther be applied directly to a dataset or called from your own
Java code. WEKA is open source software issued under the
GNU General Public License. After generating the training
and test sets, we convert those data set in the WEKA for-
mat. Then use these training and test data set as input for
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classifier and then call the classification library of WEKA
to get our classification result. Our interface is designed
in such a way that the system can select the families and
the corresponding classifiers for classifying the data. In our
classification model, n number of base classifiers (n = 5)
are used and we use Meta classifier, AdaboostM1, on top of
each base classifier. We build k-fold cross validation in our
model to achieve better classification results.
5. Experimental Setup
This section describes the experimental setup and the
methodology of our proposed classification system. We
present our approach to the classification problem based
on a data set of thirteen families which includes Trojans,
worms, virus and clean-files. Table 1 shows the name of
each family and the corresponding number of samples.
In our experiment, we tested five base classifiers: Na?ve
Bayes, SVM, Random Forest, Decision Table and IB1.
These were chosen to represent a spectrum of analysis tech-
niques. In addition, the meta-classifier and booster Ad-
aboostM1 was tested added to each of the base classifiers.
Family # of Samples
clagger 47
robknot 101
robzipA 29
robzipB 53
alureon 56
bambo 70
beovens 144
boxed 366
emerleox 78
looked 67
agobot 340
clean 161
total 1520
Table 1. Experimental Dataset
The methodology used in our experiment is given below.
We used the k-fold testing technique with k = 5.
1. Extract the features based on both FLF and PSI tech-
niques.
2. Combine the features vectors and make a WEKA (arff)
file.
3. Build families Fs for s = i = 1 . . . 13
4. Select a family Fi and split it into 5 parts.
5. Select the same instances of Fj from other families
Fj(j = i) and split into 5 parts in the same manner
as for Fi
6. Build 5 sets of Training Set Data and Test Set Data in
respective portions of 80% and 20%.
7. Select features from the Training Data.
8. Select the classifier C to be used.
9. Call WEKA libraries to train the C using the Training
Data.
10. Evaluate the Test Set Data.
11. Repeat four more times.
12. Repeat for other classifiers.
13. Repeat for other classifiers.
5.1. Experimental Results
This section presents the classification outcome of the
algorithms. Table 2 presents the weighted average exper-
imental results according to base classifiers. Since not all
families were of the same size, we calculated a weighted
average, where each family was weighted according to the
formula 6
fn∑
fi
(WFsi/WFNS) (6)
Here fi is the ith family, WFsi is the weight of the ith fam-
ily and WFNS is the total weight. Naive Bayes gives the
weakest results, while the other algorithms compare very
well with each other. The meta-classifier AdaBoostM1 im-
proves on all classifiers. Based on these results, the best
accuracy rate is 98.86% (AdaBoostM1 with DT). Figure 8
graphically represents the comparisons of classification ac-
curacy with and without boosting.
As mentioned earlier that we have tested cleanware vs.
malware in our experiment using our proposed combined
method. It has been shown that, we have achieved over
96% accuracy (meta classifier with DT) in our testing, as
indicated in table 2 and 3.
Base Classifier
NB SMO IB1 DT RF
W. Avg 94.31 97.77 97.63 98.15 96.69
Cleanfiles 84.51 92.4 85.64 91.04 94.4
Table 2. Classification outcome for Base clas-
sifier
Our results show that combined features, using both FLF
and PSI techniques, can be used to achieve high classifica-
tion accuracy for the range of methods we tested compared
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Meta classifier - AdaBoost
NB SMO IB1 DT RF
W. Avg 96.51 98.16 98.2 98.86 97.73
Cleanfiles 95.2 92.81 92.74 96.13 95.8
Table 3. Classification outcome for meta-
classifier
to the previous results in [11] and [12], which were 87%
and 97% respectively which tested them individually. This
evidence supports our hypothesis that combining a diver-
sity of static feature may be a powerful tool for classifica-
tion of malware families as well as cleanware. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, many of the PSI used for classifying came from
library code (rather than the malicious code itself). This
suggests that PSI can be used to identify which libraries the
programs used. Our classification method utilises a combi-
nation of the libraries used as part of its identification of the
malware family.
Figure 8. Comparison of classification accu-
racy (with and without boosting)
In Figure 9, we compare our current combined classi-
fication method with the previous individual PSI classifica-
tion method [12] (which had better results than [11]). It is
obvious from this figure that our present accuracy is better
in all parameters compared to existing one.
In Table 4, we compare our results with some other re-
cent work classifying large sets of malware and achieving
at least 80% accuracy. Zhao, H., et al. [16] used string
information to classify malware based on a total of over
13330 samples. They used training, test and validation
sets and applied SVM classifiers choosing the best such
Figure 9. Comparison of current method with
previous method [12].
classifier family by family. Overall performance is deter-
mined to be approximately 83.3%. Ye, Y. et.al [15], used a
post-processing technique based on analysis of API execu-
tion calls. They adapt several post-processing techniques of
associative classification in malware detection on approx-
imately 35000 malicious and 15000 benign samples. Us-
ing various data mining techniques they achieved approxi-
mately 88% accuracy.
Tian et al. [11] and [12] use an analysis similar to the
one described in the current paper to classify families and
achieved over 87% accuracy for the FLF [11] method and
97% for the PSI method.
Finally, we include some recent work by Ahmed et al.
[1] whose aim is a composite scheme for malware classifi-
cation that extracts statistical features from both spatial and
temporal information available in run-time API calls. Using
237 core API calls from six different functional categories,
their system provides an accuracy of 98% on the average.
They also carried out a scalability analysis with an accuracy
of 97 %.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents an effective malware classification
technique using a diversity of static feature selection, both
strings and function length, to identify and classify mal-
ware families and distinguish malware from cleanware. We
chose five classifiers and an additional boosting technique
(AdaboostM1) as a representative range of analytical tech-
niques, which were then compared based on their perfor-
mance. Our results demonstrated that combining string and
function length features into one test provided a superior
result to that of either separately. An overall classification
16
Families Samples Accuracy Characteristics
Ahmed F, Et.al (2009) [1] unknown 416 98% Behavioral
Ye, Y. et.al., (2010)[15] unknown 35000 88% Behavioral
Hengli Zhao, et.al., [16] unknown 13332 83.30% String information
Tian, R et.al. (2008) [11] 7 721 87% Function length frequency
Tian, R et. Al (2009) [11] 13 1367 97% Printable string information
Our method 13 1521 98.80% Function length frequency and printable string
Table 4. Comparison of our model with similar existing work.
accuracy of 98.86% (to two decimal places) was achieved,
beating all such classification methods to date. In future
work we will combine and test both static and dynamic fea-
tures with the target of achieving even better performance.
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